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TOWARDS A "MORE PERFECT UNION":
SOME THOUGHTS ON AMENDING THE
CONSTITUTION
by Thomas E. Baker*
I. INTRODUCTION

Our constitutional tradition insists that a measure must run the
Article V gauntlet to be deemed worthy enough to be added to the
Constitution. Our experience vith amending the Constitution
demonstrates that such measures are few and far between. We must
be mindful of these lessons whenever we contemplate a proposal to
amend the Constitution. This essay provides an overview of the
procedures for amending the Constitution, describes the long-run
experience with those procedures, and reminds us of the wisdom of
the Framers, as "We the People" contemplate the plethora of pending
proposals to amend the Constitution of the United States.
II. AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION
A. Amendnent Procedures

The procedures for amending the Constitution represent the
Framers' best efforts to reconcile the need for change with the desire
for stability in government structures. In the words of James Madison,

*Thomas E. Baker holds the James Madison Chair in Constitutional Law
and serves as Director of the Constitutional Law Center at Drake University Law

School; thomas.bakerodrake.edu. This article is a longer version of an essay
vwitten for A.B.A. Insights on Law and Society, Fall 2000, at 4
(http://w.T.insightsmagazine.org).
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the father of the Constitution, the amending procedures are designed
to "guard[] equally against that extreme facility, which would render
the Constitution too mutable; and that extreme difficulty, which might
perpetuate its discovered faults. " The power to amend, an important
responsibility of self-government, was essential and vital to them and
remains so today.2 As we shall see, however, the relative difficulty of
amending the Constitution has proven over time to be one of its chief
virtues.3
Article V provides for two procedural steps to amend the
Constitution.' There are also two alternatives for each step, arranged
in what Madison described as a process that is "partly federal and
partly national." 5 First, amendments may be proposed either by a
two-thirds majority in both houses of Congress or by a special
convention called at the request oftwo-thirds of the state legislatures.'
Second, amendments are ratified by three-fourths of the states, either
by the existing state legislatures or by special state conventions,
depending on which forum Congress designates.7
In recent years, some prominent professors of constitutional law
have published books and articles to argue that the provisions of
Article V may not be exclusive and that amendments might be
proposed and adopted by other means-such as a popular referendum
election or a coalescing consensus understood at some higher level of
politics-which would make amending the Constitution easier and
most probably more frequent and elaborate.8 Other scholars seek to
I THE FEDERALIST No. 43,

at 278

(James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,

1961).

2 Stephen

B. Presser, ConstitutionalAmendments: Dangerous Threat or
Democracyin Action?, 5 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 209 (2000).
3 But see Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is... Article , 12 CONST.
COMMENT. 171 (1995) (arguing that the difficulty of the Article V procedures is
a "constitutional
stupidity" of the highest order).
4
U.S. CONST. art. V.

5 THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 246 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
6

U.S. CONST. art. V.

71d.

8 E.g., 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991);
Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: ConstitutionalAmendment
Outside Article V, 94 COLuM. L. REV. 457 (1994). Other constitutionalists have
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revise our historical understanding, arguing that the actual
amendments are of little constitutional consequence-failed
amendments have been accepted and ratified amendments have been
ignored as ifArticle V was not part ofthe Constitution. So what really
counts as constitutional amendments are de facto changes in the
small-c constitution in practice and not dejure changes in the text of
the capital-C Constitution itself.9 Those academic arguments go

beyond the text and the history of the Constitution. Neither the
Congress nor the Supreme Court has paid any attention to the theories

of extra-constitutional amendments, and they are mentioned here only
for the sake of completeness, except to observe that I find them more
provocative than persuasive.1" The Article V procedures are best
understood to be the exclusive methods for formal amendment."
B. Intent of the Framers
Like so many other provisions of the Constitution, Article V was
the product of some initial disagreement and an eventual compromise
at the Constitutional Convention of 1787.12 The historic fact that the

responded dubitante. E.g., Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of
ConstitutionalChange, 65TENN.L.REV. 155 (1997); DavidR. Dow, IWnen Words
fean What We Believe They Say: The Case ofArlicle V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1
(1990); Henry Paul Monaghan, We the People[s], Original Understanding,and
ConstitutionalAmendment,76 COLUM. L. REV. 121 (1996).
' Sanford Levinson, Accountingfor ConstitutionalChange (Or,How Many
Times Hasthe UnitedStatesConstitutionBeenAmended? (a) <26; (b) 26; (c)>26;
(d)All of the Above), S CONST. COMMENT. 409 (1991); David A. Strauss, The
Irrelevance of ConstitutionalAmendments,114 HARv. L. REV. 1457 (2001).

10 "My own view of Article V is that it means what it says, and it says all that
it means." Thomas E. Baker, Exercisingthe AmendmentPower to Disapproveof
Supreme Court Decisions:A Proposalfor a "RepublicanVeto," 22 HASTINGS
CONST. L. Q. 325, 344 n.61 (1995). See also LAURENCE . TRIBE, AiERICAN
CONSTTUTlONAL LAW § 1-20, at 106 (3d ed. 2000) ("These arguments, while

sophisticated, are, in the end, unconvincing.").
IILaurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure Seriously: Reflections on
Free-FormMethod in ConstitutionalInterpretation,103 HAD.V. L. REV. 1221,
1244-45 (1995).
12 See generally Amendments to the Constitution: A Brief Legislative
History:HearingBefore the Subcommittee on the Constitutionofthe U.S. Senate
Committee on the Judiciar, 99th Cong., 1st Sess. (1935); DAVID E. KYviG,
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delegates were overstepping their own authority in Philadelphia by
writing an entirely new constitution instead of merely proposing
changes in the Articles of Confederation as they had been instructed
to do by the Congress, perhaps, may have given the delegates pause
to consider how best to provide for future changes without having to
start all over again."3 The two-step procedure was a deliberate
compromise between two camps with opposing fears for the future:
those who feared that the Congress would seek to increase its powers
at the expense of the states and those who feared that the states would
seek to truncate the powers of the fledgling federal government. 4
Like so many other Madisonian compromises at the Convention, the
delegates resolved to align those competing jealousies in direct
opposition to each other, to check and balance each other. 5 Neither

the Congress nor the States would have an exclusive prerogative over
amendments; rather, they would share the power to amend the
Constitution. The final drafting finesse was worked out only a matter
of hours before the adjournment of the Convention, with little formal
debate, though the amending corollary in the Constitution would soon

prove to be a useful and persuasive argument towards ratification by
the states.' 6 Indeed, the price of ratification-and the proof of the
Constitution-was the immediate recourse to Article V to add a Bill
of Rights. 7
Thus, amending the Constitution was made difficult, but not
impossible, in distinct contrast to the predecessor constitution, the
Articles of Confederation, which had required the political
impossibility of the unanimous consent of all the states for
amendments.' The Framers of the Constitution did not anticipate

EXPLICrTANDAUTHENTICACTS: AMENDINGTHEU.S. CoNSTITUrIoN, 1776-1995
42-65 (1996); Kurt T. Lash, Rejecting Conventional Wisdom: Federalist
Ambivalence in the Framingand Implementation ofArticle V, 38 AM. J. LEGAL
I-ST. 3197 (1994).
' See THEFEDERALISTNO. 40, at 247-55 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter
ed., 1961).
14 KYVIG, supra note 12, at 57.
15Id. at 57-58.

,61 d. at 57-60.
17 Id. at 87-109.
"8ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. XIII.
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frequent or detailed amendments. Rather, they understood that regular
lavmaking in the form of statutes would respond to economic,
political, cultural, and moral developments in American society. They
understood the Constitution to be a permanent and higher law
intended to last for the ages. Our tvo-century experience with their
design in Article V has contributed significantly to the reconciliation
of democracy and constitutionalism that defines us as a nation." What
amendments we have ratified and what proposed amendments we
have rejected, as well as how we have gone about considering them,
have helped to define our essential Constitution."0

C. PowerandResponsibilitV
Amending the Constitution is very much an exercise in
representative self-government. 2 The whole responsibility for
amendments is given over to the elected representatives of the people:
the Congress in conjunction with the state legislatures.' The two

supermajority requirements, to propose and to ratify amendments,
respect majority rule and minority rights. Thirty-four Senators, 146
Representatives, or any combination of 13 state legislative chambers
are enough opposition to keep an amendment from becoming part of
the Constitution. There must be a national consensus to amend the
Constitution, and the consensus must be as broad as it is deep.

19See ALAN P. GRI.ES, DEMOCRACY AND THE AMENDMEITS TO THE
CONSTITUTION 167 (19S7).
20 "The amendment process is thus not peripheral to the [Clonstitution, but

is its essence." Ervin ChemerinskyAmending the Constitution,96 MICH.L.REV.
1561, 1563 (1993) (revievving DAviDE. KYVIG, EXPLICMITD AUDHENTIC ACTS:
AMENDING THEU.S. CONSTITUTIoN, 1776-1995 (1996)).
2But cf Cook v. Gralike, 121 S. CL. 1029, 1036

(2001) (rejecting the
argument that the people of an individual sovereign state have the reserved power
to instruct members of their state's congressional delegation). See generallyKris
W. Iobach, May "We the People" Spear:?: The ForgottenRole of Constituent
Instructionsin Amending the Constitution, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1 (1999).
'See, e.g., Brendon Troy Ishiha a,Evetthing YouAlways Wantedto MKnow
About HowAmendmentsAreMade, but Were AfraidtoAsk, 24HASTWGS CONST.
L. Q. 545 (1997).
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There is no explicit role for the Executive in Article V: the
Presentment Clause" does not apply to amendments; therefore, a
President need not sign and cannot veto a congressional proposal.24 Of
course, there is nothing to prevent the President from initiating or
participating in the formation of public opinion supporting or
opposing a proposal to amend the Constitution. For example,
President George Bush was out in front of public opinion arguing for
an amendment that would have allowed Congress to prohibit flag
burning after the Supreme Court had ruled that flag burning was a
form of freedom of speech protected under the First Amendment.25
The amendment procedures are essentially political procedures,
given over to the elected branches.26 In numerous decisions, the
Supreme Court has consistently ruled that Article V places the
primary responsibility for amending the Constitution within the
province of the legislative branch, so the courts should play no role
whatsoever in the process of considering amendments.27 Furthermore,
the Supreme Court has repeatedly concluded that there are no implicit
2 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7,
24

ci. 2.

Hollingsworthv. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 378, 381 (1798) (sustaining the

validity ofthe Eleventh Amendment and holding that the Presentment Clause does
not apply to amendments).
' United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 312-19 (1990); Texas v. Johnson,
491 U.S. 397 (1989). See generallyKenneth L. Karst, Faiths,Flags,andFamily

Values: The Constitution of the Theater State, 41 UCLA L. REV. 1, 2-3 (1993);
Daniel H. Pollitt, The FlagBurning Controversy:A Chronology,70 N.C. L. REV.

553 (1992); Charles Tiefer, The Flag-Burning Controversy of 1989-1990:
Congress' Valid Role in ConstitutionalDialogue, 29 HARV. J. ON LEOIs. 357

(1992).
26

Compare Walter Dellinger, The Legitimacy of ConstitutionalChange:

Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 HARV. L. REV. 386 (1983) (arguing for
judicial review of the constitutional amendment process) with Laurence H. Tribe,
A Constitution WeAreAmending: In Defense ofa RestrainedJudicialRole, 97
HARV. L. REV. 433 (1983) (arguing against judicial review of the constitutional
amendment process).
27 Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 450 (1939); United States v. Sprague,
282 U.S. 716, 730 (1931). See generally CLEMENT E. VOSE, CONSTITUTIONAL
CHANGE: AMENDMENT POLITICS AND SUPREME COURTLITIGATION SINCE 1900
243-56 (1972); Thomas Millet, The Supreme Court, Political Questions, and
Article V-A Casefor JudicialRestraint, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 745, 763-66

(1983).
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limits on the substantive content of amendments, thus accepting the
seeming tautology that a provision properly added to the Constitution
cannot bejudicially ruled to be unconstitutional." The Supreme Court
also has routinely deferred to the Congress to determine issues about
its own procedures for proposing amendments and about the states'

procedures for ratifying amendments.' Congress alone determines
such matters as whether the supermajority requirements have been
satisfied in a timely fashion or whether or not to extend the time for
ratification. For example, it was the Congress, ultimately, that decided
that the 200-plus year delay between the proposal and the ratification

ofthe Twenty-Seventh Amendmentwas constitutionally proper.3" The
2

See Leser v. Garnett, 253 U.S. 130, 137 (1922) (rejecting the contention
that extending the franchise to women violated the Senate's constitutional
autonomy); NationalProhibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350, 396-S3 (1920) (rejecting the
argument that the Eighteenth Amendment's program of Prohibition improperly
interfered with the states' police powers). However, the remaining entrenchment
clause provides "no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal
Suffrage in the Senate." U.S. CONST. art. V. See generally Elai Katz, On
Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional
Entrenchment,29 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROBS. 251 (1996) (discussing whether an
Amendment can be unconstitutional); Douglas Linder, What in the Constitution
Cannot Be Amended?, 23 ARIZ. L. REV. 717 (1931) (discussing the power to
amend the Constitution and whether there are any limits to that power).
' E.g., United States v. Sprague, 232 U.S. 716, 733 (1931) (rejecting the
argument that amendments affording the national government new direct powers
over the people could be ratified only by the people themselves in state
conventions); Dillonv. Gloss, 256 U.S. 363,375-76 (1921) (holding that Congress
had the authority to set reasonable time limits on state ratifications and sevenyears
was not unreasonable); National Prohibition Cases, 253 U.S. 350 (1920) (holding
two-thirds vote of quorum of each house, rather than of entire membership was
sufficient to propose an amendment); Hollingsworth v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dali.)
378, 381-82 (1798) (sustaining the Eleventh Amendment by ruling that the
Presentment Clause did not apply to amendments).
3 See generally Richard
B. Bernstein, The Sleeper ales: The History and
Legacy of the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 61 FORDHA.I L. REV. 497 (1992);
Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the Purported
Twenty-SeventhAmendment, 11 CoNsT. CoMMENT. 101 (1994); Michael Stokes
Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V-:
The ConstitutionalLessons of the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L. L 677 (1993); William Van Alstyne,
What Do you Think About the Twenty-Seventh Amendment?, 10 COX4ST.
COMMENT. 9 (1993).
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Article V amendment power bears all the constitutional hallmarks of
a nonjusticiable or political question which, as a matter of
constitutional law, is beyond the pale ofjudicial review."1
The judicial branch, especially the Supreme Court, can alter
constitutional understandings through the power of judicial review,
the inherent power to interpret the Constitution. But even Supreme
Court Justices must bow to the ultimate sovereignty of "We the
People" expressed with supremacy in the written Constitution.32 Six
amendments have been successfully proposed and ratified to
disapprove and set aside Supreme Court rulings, often in dramatic and
even historic fashion. The Eleventh Amendment (1795) promptly and
decisively set aside the controversial 1793 holding in Chisolm v.
Georgia3 that had interpreted Article HI to authorize a federal court
to entertain a suit brought against a sovereign state by a citizen of
another state. The great Civil War Amendments-the Thirteenth
Amendment (1865), theFourteenth Amendment (1868), and Fifteenth
Amendment (1870)-were proposed bythe Reconstruction Congress
and ratified by the states to restore the Union and to be rid of
Supreme Court constitutional interpretations epitomized by the
infamous DredScottv. Sanford decision.34 The Sixteenth Amendment
31The following is the classic exposition of a nonjusticiable or political
question:
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political
question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional

commitment of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a
lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination ofa kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or
the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution

without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of
government; or an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or the potentiality of
embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various
departments on one question.
Baker v. Can, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).
32See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See generally
William Van Alstyne, A CriticalGuide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L. J.
1(1969).
33 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
60 U.S. (1 How.) 393 (1856).
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(1913), for all intents and purposes, reversed Pollock v. Farmers'
Loan and Trust Co.35 and granted Congress an expressly-enumerated
power to tax individual income. Most recently, the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment (1971) effectively reversed Oregonv. Mitchell to grant
18-year-olds the right to vote.'
III. AMEND qTs
A. History and Tradition
History and tradition play a central role in every effort to
understand any part of the Constitution, including the amendment
article, Article V.38 The nation's experience with proposing and
ratifying amendments, in turn, reveals a great deal about the
Constitution.39
By some estimates, there have been more than 10,000 bills
introduced in Congress to amend the Constitution."0 Of these, only
thirty-three garnered the necessary two-thirds vote in both houses and
proceeded to the states, and only twenty-seven have received the
necessary ratifications of three-fourths of the states.4"

3S 158 U.S. 601 (1895).
400 U.S. 112 (1970).

Three other amendments could be understood to impliedly reject earlier
Supreme Court understandings of the Constitution: the Seventeenth Amemdment
(1913) (direct election of Senators); theNineteenth Amendment (1920) (women's
suffrage); and the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (1964) (abolition of poll taxe3 in
federal elections). See Baker, supra note 10, at 342 n.53.

I See generally JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTIU1ONAL
AtmNDMENTS, PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, AND AMDIo IssuEs,

1789-1995

(ABC-CLIO, Inc. 1996).
39 See generally RESPONDINo TO IMPERFECTION-THE THEORY AND

PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson cd., 1995). The

meaning and substance of the twenty-seven ratified amendments are beyond the
scope of this essay. See generally GEORGE AIJASTAPLO, THE AIENDEITS TO
THE CONSTTTON-A COhENTARY (1995).
4 RICHARD B. BERNSTEIN & JEROME AGEL, AhiENDirO A.iERICA-IF WE
LOVE THE CONSTITUTION SO MUCH, WHY DO ,VEKEEP TR
o TO CHANGE IT?
xii (1993).
" But see Levinson, supra note 9; Strauss, supra note 9.
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There has never been a convention for proposing amendments.42
All twenty-seven amendments have been proposed by Congress,
although during the 1980s thirty-two states had at onetime or another
issued a variety of calls for a constitutional convention to consider an
amendment to require a balanced budget for the federal government.43
All but one of the twenty-seven amendments have been ratified by the
state legislatures.' Only the Twenty-First Amendment-which
repealed the Eighteenth Amendment's failed experiment with
Prohibition-was ratified by state conventions upon the stipulation of
Congress.45

Significantly, ever since the initial historic precedent of the Bill of
Rights in 1791, amendments have been added at the end of the
document, rather than incorporated directly into the text they amend.4,
This practice symbolizes the fact that an amendment is a separate
exercise in constitution writing and serves to remind us of the
importance ofthe occasion, that it is a constitutionwe are amending.
It seems constitutionally significant how relatively few successful
amendments there have been and how, more often than not, multiple
amendments have been proposed and ratified in constellations drawn
42Amendment of the ConstitutionBy

the Convention Method UnderArticle

V,1974 A.B.A. SPECIAL CONST. CONVENTION STUDY COMMITTEE 1; RUSSELL
CAPLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL BRNKSMANSHIP: AMENDING THE CONSTITUTION BY
NATIONAL CONVENTION vii (1988); COMMrITEE ON THE JUDICIARY HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 103d CONG., IS THERE A CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION IN
AMERICA'S FUTURE?, at 1 (Comm. Print 1993); Note, ProposedLegislationon the

Convention Method ofAmending the United States Constitution, 85 HARV.L.
REv. 1612 (1972).
43 CAPLAN, supra note 42, at vii.
A.B.A., supra note 42, at 1.
Id.
I James Madison had argued that amendments ought to be interlineated into
4

45

the text of the Constitution, but the first House of Representatives decided to add
them at the end of the document, which has been the practice ever since. Edward
Hartnett, A "Uniform and Entire" Constitution;or, WhatIfMadson Had Won?,
15 CONST. COMMENT. 251, 252 (1998); Price Marshall, ' Careless Written

Letter"-SituatingAmendmentsto the FederalConstitution, 51 ARK. L. REV. 95
(1998).
47McCulloch

v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316,407 (1819) ("[W]e must
never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding."). Id. See also Tribe,
supranote 26, at 445.
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to resemble the political issues and national priorities of four distinct
in American history. 8 Between

eras

1789

and

1804, the

"Anti-federalist" or "Jeffersonian" amendments were adopted.49 The
first ten amendments, popularly known as the Bill of Rights (1791),
secure the fundamental rights of the individual against the national

government."0 The Eleventh Amendment (1795) prevents federal

courts from entertaining lawsuits against the states." The Twelfth
Amendment (1804) sought to harmonize political parties with the
electoral college to avoid the problems the House of Representatives
had with the election of 1800 between Thomas Jefferson and Aaron
52

Burr.

The "Civil War Amendments," the Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and
Fifteenth Amendments, were ratified during Reconstruction in the
years 1865, 1868, and 1870, respectively.53 Ratified in the aftermath
of a cataclysm that shook the constitutional structure to its
foundations, those mighty provisions ended slavery, enforced due
process and equal protection against the states, and guaranteed new
freedmen the right to vote."4
The populist and progressive movements at the beginning of the
century produced four ratifications: the federal income tax in the
Sixteenth Amendment (1913), the direct election of Senators in the
Seventeenth Amendment (1913), the national Prohibition in the
Eighteenth Amendment (1919), and women's suffrage in the
Nineteenth Amendment (1920)." 5

' Walter Dellinger, Amending Process, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE
AMERICAN CONSTrrTION 72,74 (Leonard W. Levy &KennethL. Karsteds., 2d
ed. 2000); see also Kathleen Sullivan, Amending Process (Update) in 1
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 75,75 (Leonard W. Levy &
Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000); John P, Vile, ConstitutionalAmendments,
in THE OXTORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
181, 181 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., 1992).
Dellinger, supra note 48, at 72.
5'U.S. CoNsT. amends. I-x
5,U.S. CoNsT. amend. X.
52 VILE, supra note 38, at 313.
' Dellinger, supra note 48, at 72.
5 Vile, supra note 48, at 181-82.
' Dellinger, supra note 48, at 72.
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The most recent set of ratifications have dealt thematically with
federal elections: the Twenty-Second Amendment (1951) set a
two-term limit for the office of the President; the Twenty-Third
Amendment (1961) awarded three electoral college votes to the
District of Columbia; the Twenty-Fourth Amendment (1964)
abolished poll taxes; the Twenty-Fifth Amendment (1967) revised the
constitutional rules for presidential succession and devised a new
procedure for presidential disability; and the Twenty-Sixth
Amendment (1971) extended the franchise to 18-year-olds.56
This patterning is not perfect, and a few amendments cannot be
drawn into these four groupings: the Twentieth Amendment (1933)
limited the lame duck session of Congress, and the Twenty-First
Amendment (1933) repealed Prohibition.57 The Twenty-Seventh
Amendment (1992)-which requires that any pay increase for
members of Congress can go into effect only after the next regular
election-has the most idiosyncratic ratification story.58 It was
proposed by the first Congress as part of the original Bill of Rights
and was all but forgotten for more than 200 years before it was dusted
off and ratified by the requisite number of states 5 -- something that is
not likely to happen again because the modem practice is for Congress
to include a time limit, usually seven years, in proposed amendments.6"
B. Lessons FromFailedAmendments: the Case of the ERA6'
Congress has voted to propose six amendments that have failed
to be ratified by the requisite three-fourths of the states.' An
m Id. at 72-73.
57 Dellinger, supra note 48, at 73.
" Sullivan, supra note 48, at 75.
-9 Id. at 75-76.
6 Mason Kalfus, Comment, Why Time Limits on the Ratification of
ConstitutionalAmendmentsViolate.Article V, 66U. CHI.L. REV. 437,437 (1999).
6 This discussion of the ERA relies substantially on Judge Daughtrey's
James Madison Lecture delivered at N.Y.U. law school. Martha Craig Daughtrey,
Women andthe Constitution: Where We Are at the End ofthe Century,75 N.Y.U.
L. REV. 1 (2000). The author was present when Judge Daughtrey revisited this
subject at Drake University Law School on September 28, 2000, as part of the

Distinguished Speakers Series sponsored by the Constitutional Law Center.
62 See Sullivan, supra note 48, at 75.
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amendment proposed along vith the Bill of Rights would have set a
population limit for congressional districts which, given today's
population, would have required more than 5,000 members in the
House of Representatives.' In the early nineteenth century, an
amendment was proposed that would have automatically expatriated
anyone who accepted a title or honor from any foreign government
Athout the consent of Congress," a measure that would have played
havoc vAth Nobel prize vnners and knighted former Presidents.
There was a desperate and futile effort on the eve of the Civil War to
appease the southern states by proposing to prohibit any future
amendment that would eliminate slavery.6 As part of the progressive
movement in the 1930s, a proposed amendment would have
authorized Congress to regulate child labor in the face of an unvlling
Supreme Court, but the Justices eventually got around to finding the
power in the Commerce Clause." In the 1970s, a democrat-majority
in Congress proposed to grant congressional representation to the
District of Columbia, but the political reality that the measure would
result in the election ofat least three more democrats to Congress was
enough for republicans to stall the measure in the statehouses.'
The most important recent showdovwn over a proposed
amendment was the ten years of debate whether to add an amendment
for sex or gender equality-the Equal Rights Amendment. 3 Congress
proposed the ERA in 1972 vith the usual seven-year deadline for
ratifications, then extended the period for three more years.9 After
some early momentum, however, in the end only thirty-five states
ratified the measure-three short of the number needed-and some
6BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 40, at 45-46.
a'Id
at 177.
65
1d at 06.
6IM at 179-0. See United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941), overruling
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (191,).
67 BERNSTEIN & AGEL, supra note 40, at 143-43.
6 See generally JANE I. MANSBRIDGE, WHY WE LOST THE ERA (1906);

Debra Baker, The FightAin't Over, 85 A.B.A. L 52 (Aug. 1999); Daugbtrcy,
supra note 61.
SHILR.J. Res. 20,, 92d Cong. (1971); S.J. Res. 8, 92d Cong (1971); H.ILJ

Res. 638,95th Cong. (1978) (exIendingraificationpariod).SeegenerallyBarbama
A. Brown et al., The EqualRightsAmendment: A ConstitutionalBasisforEqual
Rightsfor Women, 80 YALE L. L 371 (1971).
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states that had ratified the proposal went back to try to rescind their
earlier ratifications.7"
The ERA proposal galvanized opponents at the time to warn of
"dire social consequences" like unisex bathrooms, women in combat,
and the end of alimony.7 Even though the measure failed ratification,
American social arrangements have, in fact, developed along these
policy tangents.' Unisex bathrooms are found on almost every college
campus and inAllyMcBeal's law firm, women have served in combat,
and no-fault divorce laws have replaced alimony.
The Supreme Court has decided a series of cases striking down
state laws that discriminate against women and men under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which was ratified
in 1868.' Interestingly, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, who brought
many of those landmark cases to the Supreme Court as an advocate
before she was appointed to that bench in 1993, believes "'[t]here is
no practical difference between what has evolved and the ERA."' 74
Over the years since, several states have added an equal rights
amendment to their state constitution, and each year other states take
up similar measures. 75 Today, more women than ever serve at all
levels ofgovernment. Still, women's rights organizations and feminists
continue to press Congress to resubmit the ERA to the states to
preserve political gains and to serve as an important symbol to the
nation. Justice Ginsburg herself continues to insist "' [i]t belongs in our
Constitution as a norm society embraces. It's what you'd like to teach
ninth graders in civics class. "'76 But opponents continue to resist and
70 But cf

Allison L. Held et al., The EqualRightsAmendment: Why the ERA
Remains Legally Nable and Properly Before the States, 3 WM. & MARY J.
WOMEN & L. 113 (1997) (arguing that if the requisite additional states were to
approve the ERA then the amendment should be deemed ratified).
7 Baker,

supra note 68, at 53.

SId.

' E.g., United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515 (1996); Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
74 Baker, supra note 68, at 55.
75 See Daughtrey, supra note 61, at 24 nn. 122 & 123 (listing seven state
constitutions with their own equal rights amendments and thirteen additional state
constitutions with a general provision for equality).
76Id. at 22 n. 113 (quoting David Harper, Justice Assesses Gender Issue,
TULSA WORLD, Aug. 29, 1997, at A10).
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worry out loud what the measure would mean for abortion policy and
go on to imagine that an Equal Rights Amendment could lead to a
genderless, unisex society vAth the legitimization ofgay marriages and
the like.' Opponents also link their opposition to their background
mistrust of activist judges who might be emboldened to insinuate
themselves and their subjective policy preferences into all aspects of
the private sphere in the name of a new right of gender equality.7"
C. CurrentPendingAmendments

The amendments being debated in Congress at any given time
represent the most divisive issues of the day. One side or the other,
sometimes both sides of a contentious issue, often seeks to ratchet
their point of view up to the next level of politics with the hope of
constitutionalizing their policy preference once and for all. Frequently,
proponents of constitutional amendments have been disappointed in
the regular lawmaking process in Congress or the courts.79 They
regularly try to use Article V to attempt to trump a controversial
Supreme Court decision with which they disagree."
To its critics, today's Congress seems to be suffering from a bad
case of "amendmentitis."8' Consider some of the amendments
77 Baker, supra note

6S, at 55.
7i See generallyRuth Gavison, Feminism andthe PublicPrivat Distinction,
45 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1992); ElizabethlML Schneider, The Dialectic ofRights and
Politics: Perspectivesfrom the Women's Movement, 61 N.Y.U. L. REv. 5S9
(1986).
' See generally Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting the
Constitution:AnEconomicAnalysisofthe ConstitutionalAmcndmentProcess,62
FORDHAM L. REv. 111 (1993) (analyzing the economics of amending the
Constitution).
" See Sanford Levinson, Constitutional Imperfection, Judicial
Misinterpretation, and the Politics of ConstitutionalAmendment: Thoughts
GeneratedBy Some CurrentProposalsto Amend the Constitution, 1996 BYUL.
REv. 611. See also supratext accompanying notes 2,-33.
"' See generally John Conyers, Jr., Is the United States Constitution a
"RoughDraft"?An Open Letter to the 105th Congress,6 WIDEINRJ. PUB. L. 323

(1997); Kathleen Mv.Sullivan, ConstitutionalAmendmentitis, THE AmERIC.AN
PROSPECT, Fall 1995, at20; KathleenM. Sullivan, ConstitutionalConstancy: 1,7y
Congress Should Cure Itself of Amendment Fever, 17 CARDOZO L. REv. 691

(1995); The Constitution Project, "Great and Extraordinary Occasions":
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currently being considered by Congress. One proposal would effect a
wholesale overruling of the Supreme Court's Establishment Clause
jurisprudence.' Another that has passed the House, but not the
Senate, with the requisite two-thirds majority would have given the
Congress the power to prohibit and punish flag burning.83 Other bills
currently before Congress include a proposal to authorize a line-item
veto for the President, a proposal to require that federal judges be
reconfirmed every ten years,85 a proposal to abolish the electoral
college to provide for the direct election of the President,8 6 several
proposals for various versions of term limits for members of
Congress, 7 and a proposed amendment to guarantee rights to victims
of crimes.88 As with all things political, different people assign
different value and importance to these various proposals to change
the nation's fundamental law. 9 The wisdom-or the folly-of a
proposal to amend the Constitution often is in the eye of the
beholder.9"
Some amendments go out of fashion while they are under
consideration, disappearing from popular concern.9 For example, the
balanced budget amendment was in the headlines and looked close to

Developing Guidelines for Constitutional Change (1999) at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/cai/guidelines/index.html (lastvisited Apr. 17,
2001) (on file with the Widener Journal of Public Law).
82HR.J. Res. 66, 106th Cong. (1999).
H.RJ. Res. 33, 106th Cong. (1999).
H.RJ. Res. 9, 106th Cong. (1999).
8 H.RJ. Res. 11, 106th Cong. (1999).
H.R.J. Res. 23, 106th Cong. (1999).
w H.R.J. Res. 2, 106th Cong. (1999); H.R.J. Res. 18, 106th Cong. (1999).
H.R.J. Res. 64, 106th Cong. (1999).
See, e.g., Bruce Fein, Victims' RightsAmendment Needs a Quick Death,
NEWSDAY, July 23, 1998, at A48; Stuart Taylor, Jr., Victims'Rights: Leave the
ConstitutionAlone, NATIONAL JOURNAL, Apr. 22, 2000, at 1254; Laurence H.

Tribe & Paul G. Cassell, Embed the Rights of Victims in the Constitution, LOS
ANGELES TIMES, July 6, 1998, at B5.

' See, e.g., Ross K. Baker, Legislators Out of Control on Foolish
ConstitutionalAmendments, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Apr. 30, 2000, at C21; Kristin

Loiacono, Amending the Constitution,TRIAL, Jan. 2001, at 12.
"' See J. B. Ruhi, The Metrics of ConstitutionalAmendments: And Why
ProposedEnvironmental Quality Amendments Don't Measure Up, 74 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 245 (1999) (tracing the ups and downs of the "EQA").
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passing Congress just a few years ago, partly as a consequence of
pressure felt from the calls of thirty-tvo states for a constitutional
convention to consider it.92 But when the burgeoning economy began
to yield consistent federal surpluses, the political pressure for passage
lessened and the measure disappeared from view, at least for now.
And by now, the bills introduced annually over the last so many years
proposing amendments to permit prayer in public schools,93 to outlaw
school busing,9" and to ban abortions?' have become more like
symbolic rituals than realistic efforts to change the Constitution. They
are rallying points for organizations on their side for purposes of
direct mail fundraising and membership recruitment, but they are not
perceived by the other side as a genuine political threat any more.
D. Difficulty andRarit, ofAmendments
Ultimately, it is the Constitution that unites us as "We the
People"; thus, only matters of a lasting national consensus fully
deserve our constitutional allegianceY Everything else is merely
politics. Just as all politics is said to be "local," all politics is temporary
and always in play-always debatable and always subject to another
vote. Most things Congress and the state legislatures do can be
undone by the next election-that is to say that the people can "vote
the rascals out" and replace them with new legislators who can repeal
the unvse or unwanted laws. This is not so with constitutional
amendments, which must be repealed by the arduous procedure of
ratifying another amendment. Only one amendment has ever been

' Brendon Troy Ishikawa, The Stealth Amendment: The Impending
Ratification and Repeal ofthe FederalBudgetAmendment, 35 TLtsAL. J. 353,
356 (2000). See generally Daid E. Kyvig, Refining or Resisting Modern
Government? The Balanced Budget Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, 28
AKRON L. REv. 97 (1995).
93 HR.J. Res. 7,
106th Cong. (1999).
' ILR.J. Res. 13, 104th Cong. (1995).
95I-R.J. Res. 4, 106th
Cong. (1999).

Of course, the contents of the Constitution are always open to debate and
rightly so. See, e.g., CoNsTITUTIoNAL STuPIDmIEs, CONTITTIOALTnAGEDIES
(William N. Eskridge, Jr. et al. eds., 1998).
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repealed: Prohibition was ratified in 191997 and eventually repealed in
1933.9

There is a reason that there have been only 27 amendments over
more than 200 years: Constitutional amendments must have the
sustained and one-sided support of great majorities in the Congress
and across the states. Very few issues ever gamer such importance
and support.
Constitution-amending certainly is no sport for the short-winded.
According to the account of one of the historic champions of the
Nineteenth Amendment, the effort to guarantee women the franchise
took 72 years and included 56 state-referenda campaigns, 480
state-legislative campaigns, 47 state-constitutional conventions, 277
state-party conventions, 30 national-party conventions, and 19
campaigns before 19 successive Congresses-just to get the measure
before the states for ratification."
Most issues of public policy are too evanescent or too closely
contested to achieve and sustain the necessary supermajorities at the
national and state levels. Such issues neither merit nor permit
constitutional amendment. That is how most issues in our
constitutional democracy properly are left to ordinary politics-to
simple and temporary majorities of the legislative branches to
determine and to change through the ordinary legislative process.
Democracy, after all, "is a method of finding proximate solutions for
insoluble problems." 1" We must keep trying to do right by ourselves
and others.
IV. CONCLUSION

The Constitution is different, so constitution-amending must be
different. "We the People" ought to be convinced that a proposed
amendment moves us as a nation and a people "towards a more
perfect union." The true genius in Article V, therefore, is found in the
97

U.S. CoNsT. amend. XVIII.

'U.S. CONST. amend. XXI.

" Daughtrey, supranote 61, at 5 (quoting CARRIE CHAPMAN CATr&NETrlE
ROGERS SHULER, WOMAN SUFFRAGE AND POLITICS 107-08 (1923)).

100 REINHOLD NIEBUHR,
DARKNESS 118 (1944).
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elegant difficulty of its procedures to amend the Constitution and to
place anissuebeyond majority politicswhere legislatures and elections
cannot reach. In this, as in so many other constitutional things, history
has demonstrated the wisdom of the founding generation. A measure
that successfully runs the Article V gauntlet rightly belongs in the
Constitution. Our experience with amending the Constitution
demonstrates beyond peradventure that such measures are few and far
between.

